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ABSTRACT 
 What should institutional training teach to adequately prepare newly selected 
captains for service in Special Forces? This thesis looks holistically at what Special 
Forces officers need to know before arriving to a Special Forces group and makes 
recommendations on where the current training pipeline can improve. 
 The data for this research was provided by a summer 2020 survey from the 
Special Warfare Center and School that surveyed 122 leaders from across the five active 
duty groups and contained six questions that identify the skills Special Forces officers 
need to be successful at operational groups and solicit critiques of the current training 
pipeline. 
 This research project accomplished two things. First, it developed a model for 
what a Special Forces officer needs to know before arriving at an operational group. 
Second, it identifies four subjects to add into or improve during the current training 
pipeline. These research results can improve or validate the Special Forces Regiment’s 
current process for training officers and inform future research on the topic of Special 
Forces officer training and officer professional development. 
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This thesis uses a Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) survey to attempt to 
answer the question of what institutional training is required to adequately prepare newly 
selected captains for service in Special Forces. Accepting the constraint of a 73-week 
training pipeline for Special Forces captains, it attempts to use the survey to identify what 
skills must be taught and at what depth they need to be trained. The survey, by the SWCS 
Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Proponency, was conducted during the summer of 
2020 and collected data from over 100 respondents from the active force. Analysis of  
the data produced a model of 42 individual subjects grouped into 10 themes describing 
what an O3 level 18A needs to be successful. The survey did not show a strong  
preference for the levels of depth of most subjects except that mission planning and tools, 
domestic interactions, oral (briefing) communication, key leader engagements, written 
communication, and combined arms maneuver were required to be trained at the highest 
proficiency depth. The survey also proposed adding training on cyber threats, ground force 
commander skills, controlling close air support, and training management while giving no 
significant data that anything should be removed from the current training pipeline.  
In conclusion, the thesis recommends four subject areas to be added to the Special 
Forces officer training pipeline at the following points during training. 
• Ground force commander specific training should be increased throughout 
the SFQC 
• Training management should be added to the ARSOFCCC 
• Mission sets and type should be added to the ARSOFCCC 
• SOF enterprise should be added to the ARSOFCCC 
xiv 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Between Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and arriving at an 
operational group, a selected captain attends eight different training courses that make up 
73 weeks of training to earn the designation of an 18A, a Special Forces Officer. So, what 
is the collective end state these eight courses are supposed to produce? Each course 
routinely analyzes their curriculum to provide a better outcome, but the entire training 
process itself is less frequently examined. What institutional training is required to 
adequately prepare newly selected captains for service in Special Forces? To attempt to 
answer this question, I will use data from the active duty force to identify the ideal finished 
product of a newly qualified 18A and work backward to identify how to produce this 
product with an emphasis on the two courses that focus specifically on officer 
development: the Army Special Operations Forces Captains Career Course (ARSOFCCC) 
and the military occupational specialty (MOS) 18A course. 
Success in training a Special Forces captain takes two forms: preparing the captain 
to lead, train, and employ a Special Forces operational detachment alpha (ODA) and 
preserving the human capital investment each selected captain represents. A Special Forces 
captain’s first goal is to command an ODA and ensure this unit succeeds in its operational 
missions globally. To do this, the captain will need to use leadership, managerial, and 
interpersonal skills to ensure the ODA is trained and succeeds operationally. However, this 
is not the only goal of institutional training because investment protection and future 
potential also weigh in heavily. Special Forces exists as a branch within the larger Army 
and thus is subject to the Army’s regulations and policies for promotion and career 
development. Special Forces branch must ensure their officers are competitive for 
promotion to protect the investment in human capital for future service. 
Therefore, before diving into the things that Special Forces captains must know, it 
is important to understand two forces at work that frame the process. These forces are time 
and the Army’s officer education requirements. I will go over these two considerations 
carefully because they illustrate that the question is not as simple as developing a checklist 
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of tasks to train. Rather, they create a two-dimensional checklist: examining not only what 
to train but how well to train it. 
A. TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE—THE HUMAN RESOURCING 
METHODOLOGY OF UP OR OUT 
The Army manages the rank of all officers according to a strict timeline. This is 
how the Army controls the officer population and ensures a human resource environment 
that is “up or out.” Officers in the ranks of lieutenant through major have two opportunities 
for selection to the next rank. If they have not been not selected for promotion after the 
second opportunity, then they are involuntarily separated from the Army to make room for 
advancing talent rising through the ranks below them.1 Each rank, regardless of branch 
within the Army, has a fixed amount of time for service in that rank. 
The specific branches determine what institutional training and operational 
experience are required for promotion. Each rank can be characterized by collecting the 
requisite training and branch dictated experience required for consideration for promotion. 
Training is run by the various centers of excellence and branches identify specific jobs as 
key developmental (KD) positions because the duties and responsibilities of these jobs 
should produce the necessary operational experience for success at the next rank. Time 
once again becomes a factor because, at a minimum, officers need to complete their 
institutional training and operational assignments prior to being evaluated for their first 
opportunity for promotion. This ensures these officers are given two opportunities to 
succeed. Failing to do this results in passively risking or deciding to force an officer out of 
the Army. This not only creates a loss in human resource investment, it can severely impact 
the officer personally if this occurs before the 20-year mark because of the large financial 
implications of retirement. 
This reality of human resource management affects the Special Forces branch in a 
unique way at the captain rank because Special Forces conducts both developmental and 
initial training for its captains. Special Forces is a non-accession branch, which means that 
 
1 Department of the Army, Officer Transfers and Discharges, AR 600-8-24 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2020), 99. 
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it does not receive new officers (i.e., lieutenants) directly from their commissioning 
sources. Thus, it does not benefit from the “lieutenant years” to train and introduce officers 
to the specific mission and role of Special Forces in the way that captains in other branches 
experience during their time in the rank of lieutenant. While the Special Forces Regiment 
enjoys recruiting officers who are more mature and come with a diversity of prior 
experience, it creates a potentially burdensome Special Forces specific educational 
requirement that must be accomplished in a limited time. 
The process for producing qualified Special Forces captains occurs in two parts: 
assessment and selection and institutional training culminating with the award of the 18A 
MOS. Assessment and selection begins by recruiting and screening applicants from across 
the entire Army. This occurs at Special Forces recruiting stations across all the Army’s 
world-wide posts and through a board conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The board 
selects which officers are going to be invited to travel to Fort Bragg for an in-person 
interview known as SFAS. Officers attending SFAS must have already been selected for 
promotion to captain. Special Forces will not bother interviewing an officer who is failing 
to progress in their basic branch. SFAS is a three-week event that is the gate for all 
candidates aspiring to join Special Forces, both officer and enlisted. Candidates must not 
only complete SFAS, they must perform well enough to be selected. SFAS intends to 
determine which candidates have the character traits and innate skills required to succeed 
in Special Forces training.  
Officers selected at SFAS now have two blocks to check professionally with respect 
to their institutional training. As captains managed by Special Forces branch, they must go 
through and pass initial training to be awarded the 18A MOS so that they can serve in 
Special Forces KD positions coded for 18As. However, they must also fulfill the 
professional military education (PME) requirements set up under the Army’s Officer 
Education System (OES). More on the OES will follow later. The point here is that because 
of the initial training requirement, there is a substantial time investment in institutional 
training required for new Special Forces captains in comparison to other Army branches 
who are only further developing their personnel during the captains level PME. 
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The time problem is how to balance the six years between training and operational 
use. Officer board timelines are set by Human Resources Command and based off year 
group cohorts from when the officer entered active service. Currently, the board for 
selection to captain occurs in an officer’s third year of active service and the board for 
selection to major occurs in an officer’s ninth year of active service. This leaves six years 
of time spent as a captain. For example, the 2015 year-group cohort was boarded for 
promotion to captain in 2018. This year group now has six years to meet their institutional 
training requirement and collect the sufficient evaluations in active units to be competitive 
before their major’s board which will occur in 2024. Special Forces branch must balance 
how much time it spends keeping its officers in training versus how much time the officers 
get in the force doing the job they were hired to do. 
B. BACKGROUND: THE ARMY’S OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM  
The Army is structured and methodical in how it trains and develops leaders. At 
the fundamental level, the Army breaks down its leadership development into three 
domains: operational, institutional, and self-development.2 The OES structures the 
institutional domain of this process.3 The OES as alluded to above follows a pattern of 
institutional education at the front end of each rank followed by assignments to the force 
where officers improve through operational experience and continued self-development. It 
is the OES that prescribes that all captains must attend a captains career course (CCC).4 
We can now turn to the specifics of the training path for Special Forces officers. 
After SFAS, captains selected to become 18As attend the ARSOFCCC followed by the 
Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). Both courses are located at Fort Bragg. All 
members of the Special Forces, officer and enlisted, attend the SFQC to receive training 
before they can be assigned to serve in the operational groups. Officers attend all the 
courses within the SFQC and go through the 18A course during the MOS phase of the 
 
2 Department of the Army, Army Leader Development Program, DA PAM 350-58 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2013), 2. 
3 Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development, AR 350-1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2017), 70. 
4 Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development, 70.  
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SFQC. At the end of the SFQC, officers who had been selected at SFAS are now 18As, 
qualified Special Forces officers. The ARSOFCCC however is a recent development with 
some clouded history.  
Before 2013, Special Forces sent its captains to the Maneuver Captains Career 
Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Georgia, with captains from the Infantry and Armor 
branches, to receive credit for the CCC requirement. The MCCC is a six-month course run 
under the command of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). However, this six-
month period and additional move was a large time investment. In 2013, the Special 
Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE) made a big change to reclaim some of this 
precious time. 
Sending officers to attend the MCCC at Fort Benning incurred an additional cost in 
money, but an even higher cost in time. Officers attending the MCCC had to move from 
their duty station to Fort Benning. They spent six months attending MCCC before making 
a second move to Fort Bragg to attend the SFQC. To reduce this time and financial cost, 
the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) created the ARSOFCCC to fulfill the CCC 
requirement using training already being conducted in the SFQC. Army regulation (AR) 
350–1 dictates that a CCC will “provide advanced branch-specific and branch-immaterial 
staff process training.”5 Therefore, if the 18A course is already providing the “branch-
specific” training, SOCoE could create a course that fulfilled the “branch-immaterial” 
requirement that would not require six months and an additional move. Thus, the 
ARSOFCCC became the venue to conduct the branch-immaterial training. Then, when it 
was combined with the branch-specific training of the 18A course, the two courses would 
confer CCC credit as required by the AR 350-1. This could all be accomplished at Fort 
Bragg, reducing the cost in time and money of sending officers to Fort Benning for the 
MCCC. 
It followed that because the ARSOFCCC appeared to be taking the place of the 
MCCC, it needed to closely resemble the curriculum taught at Fort Benning to produce a 
similar officer. Therefore, ARSOFCCC used the MCCC curriculum as a base during its 
 
5 Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development, 70.  
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formation and continues to heavily rely on that base. However, the ARSOFCCC is not a 
replacement for MCCC. It streamlines the process of training officers and delivers them to 
the operational force before the Army’s next phase of career progression forces them to 
move up or out. The ARSOFCCC is not its own separate course; it is a piece to a whole 
solution. More importantly, when the SOCoE took control of this phase of training, it 
gained more control over the training time of its officers.  
This streamlined process did not come without cost, however. The deal struck 
between Special Forces and the Army was that officers in the Special Forces pipeline 
would not be considered CCC qualified until they had completed the MOS portion of the 
SFQC. This created a high stake for Army officers applying to Special Forces. If they failed 
out of any portion of training prior to completing the MOS phase of training, the time they 
spent moving to Fort Bragg and in any time spent in training there was a loss. They would 
have to return to their basic branch still needing to attend a career course in order to gain 
the CCC credit required by the AR 350-1. This added risk to attempting to become a Green 
Beret is not lost on the type of savvy planners that Special Forces is looking to attract.  
C. THE OPPORTUNITY 
As mentioned in the previous section, the opportunity created by this move is that 
the SOCoE has now gained control of 12 weeks of training that previously was left up to 
the MCoE. Viewing the ARSOFCCC as a step in the Special Forces officer training 
progression poses revisiting the fundamental question in order to assess what training 
objectives should be produced from that extra time now gained by the SOCoE. What 
institutional training is required to adequately prepare newly selected captains for service 
in Special Forces? Now that the SOCoE controls the ARSOFCCC, it can control the course 
curriculum. This has become especially relevant with the optimization of the SFQC, where 
the MOS phase portion lost six weeks of training. The ARSOFCCC has an increased 
opportunity to provide training on critical skills that the 18A course may no longer have 
the time to train, especially since adding eight weeks to the curriculum to make it a 
complete CCC. The Combined Arms Center still controls a common core component of 
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the OES requirement, but the SOCoE has expanded its opportunity to train on things 
specific to the needs of the operational force. 
To answer this question, I will examine the results from a survey of over one 
hundred officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from all five active duty groups. 
In the following chapters, I will go over the methodology of the survey and analysis of the 
results, present the analysis of the results, and conclude with my observations and 
recommendations for how we are institutionally training our 18As. My intent is to 
accomplish two things. The first is to provide recommendations on how the ARSOFCCC 
and 18A MOS course can work complementary to train new 18As based on research from 
the force. Second is to formally document research on what Special Forces officers need 
to be operationally successful coming out of their initial training. These two goals could 
improve or validate the regiment’s current process for training officers and become a 
source for future research on the topic of Special Forces officer professional military 
education. 
It may be tempting to solve some of the problems listed in this chapter by proposing 
to remove the time constraint on captains in Special Forces. This is certainly an attractive 
option for Special Forces officers who want to remain on ODAs for as long as possible. 
This decision is a big Army decision though. This thesis comes from the viewpoint and 
perspective of commanders within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC), not the Secretary of the Army. While Special Forces Branch is attacking this 
problem from the officer timeline angle, I will approach the problem as someone who 
works within the system laid out in this chapter. 
8 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
Any attempt to answer this question would be incomplete without first examining 
doctrine. However, doctrine faces two setbacks: it is general and the process to update it 
takes time. For these reasons, answering this question requires a more live data set. This 
can be found in responses from the active force. In this thesis, I will seek to answer what 
institutional training should teach to newly selected captains by conducting a qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of the results of a survey conducted by SWCS in the summer of 
2020. My focus will be not only what captains need to know, but also the varying levels at 
which they need to know it. Doctrine is a good place to start, but a closer look will highlight 
the need for information pulled directly from the force. 
A. ARMY DOCTRINE ON SPECIAL FORCES OFFICERS 
The Army maintains a vast amount of recorded knowledge through doctrine in the 
form of several publications. This section will examine the guiding pieces of doctrine that 
establish requirements for Special Forces officers at the captain rank. Existing literature on 
the training of Special Forces officers can be grouped into two categories: doctrine 
specifically relating to the role of the Special Forces captain and doctrine relating to the 
mission and role of the Special Forces ODA. The first category speaks directly to the 
training outcomes of Special Forces captains while the latter is helpful because it indirectly 
reveals what captains must know given their responsibility for everything the team does or 
fails to do.  
The two guiding sources of doctrine that speak specifically of the Special Forces 
captain are the Department of the Army pamphlet (DA PAM) 600–3, Commissioned 
Officer Professional Development and Career Management, which outlines expectations 
for officers of every branch, and field manual (FM) 3–18, Special Forces Operations, 
which specifically examines Special Forces units. The Special Forces chapter of DA PAM 
600-3 details the purpose, functions, and unique features found in Special Forces and its 
officers. These can be summarized that Special Forces officers must understand balance 
between diplomacy and force to work with and through indigenous people to achieve 
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favorable conditions for conflict resolution.6 Additionally, it states that prior to selection, 
Special Forces officers must serve as lieutenants in small-unit leadership positions in a 
conventional Army branch to ensure “knowledge of conventional Army operations and 
leadership experience.”7 Next, FM 3-18 describes a Special Forces captain by stating that 
the officer must be “an expert in all things related to unconventional warfare and 
counterinsurgency operations… an adept planner and tactician.”8 These doctrinal sources 
describe an end state, but they require interpretation to translate them into a training 
curriculum. 
The second useful category of doctrine relates to the requirements of the ODA and 
Special Forces units at large. This creates a set of mission-oriented tasks for Special Forces 
officers that form a majority of the current curriculum for training Special Forces officers. 
This starts with the overarching doctrine of Joint Publication 3-05, which outlines the core 
activities for U.S. special operations forces (SOF). That doctrine is refined in subordinate 
publications down to FM 3-05, which outlines the core activities specifically for Army 
SOF (ARSOF). Finally, FM 3-18 describes core activities specifically for ARSOF in the 
form of nine principle tasks.9 While all of these doctrinal sources are helpful in describing 
what a Special Forces captain will need to ensure his/her team is able to do, they do not go 
into much detail about the specific skills a Special Forces captain needs to actually 
accomplish these things. In addition, they are the products of past successes and reflect 
how the Special Forces Regiment has achieved success historically. They may not reflect 
the most up-to-date requirements that the Special Forces Regiment has today. Doctrine 
does not provide a clear listing of what Special Forces officers need in a level of detail 
sufficient for constructing a curriculum.  
 
6 Department of the Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development, DA PAM 600-3 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), Special Forces Branch paragraph 3a. 
7 Department of the Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development, Special Forces Branch 
paragraph 3a. 
8 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, FM 3-18 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2014), 4–25. 
9 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, 3–3. 
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Doctrine does, however, spell out what individual centers of excellence are required 
to do when developing and refining training. This process of refining Army schools comes 
from Training and Doctrine Command Regulation (TR) 350–70. This regulation mandates 
that centers and schools develop individual critical task lists (ICTL) from critical task and 
site selection boards (CTSSB).10 These CTSSBs are staffed by members of the operating 
force who assess current needs of the force, balanced with mission requirements and future 
projections, to develop the ICTLs as guidance for schools to train soldiers. The last CTSSB 
for training 18As was held in November 2012. Additionally, that CTSSB only examined 
the 18A course specifically, not the entirety of training that goes into new Special Forces 
captains prior to their first day at an operational Special Forces group. The 10-week 18A 
course only accounts for 14% of the time that Special Forces captains spend in training 
prior to arriving at their ODAs. It is worth stating that this is the only course where the 
student body consists solely of future 18As and thus is rightfully viewed as the largest 
influence in producing Special Forces captains, but the other 63 weeks of training are also 
important in viewing the totality of a Special Forces captain’s institutional training. At the 
time of this writing, fall of 2020, there is another CTSSB in the process for the 18A course. 
My goal here is to supplement the findings of that board by looking at a broader scope of 
training venues that 18As attend. 
B. SURVEY QUESTION METHODOLOGY 
To answer the question, I examined the data collected from a summer 2020 survey 
conducted by the SWCS Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Proponency (DOT-DP).11 
DOT-DP distributed the survey in preparation for a CTSSB for the 18A course scheduled 
for fall of 2020. This survey is the best method for answering the question at hand because 
the responses come directly from the men who are either currently serving as detachment 
commanders, serve immediately with detachment commanders, or supervise detachment 
 
10 Department of the Army, Army Learning Policies and Systems, TR 350–70 (Fort Eustis, VA: 
Training and Doctrine Command, 2017), 33. 
11 SWCS conducts an internal approval process for conducting internal research. Using their data for 
this thesis was determined by the Naval Postgraduate School internal review board to not be human subject 
research. 
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commanders. The results of this survey represent the most current and live data on what 
skills are needed from detachment commanders. This allows the data to include emerging 
requirements for detachment commanders that have not yet been codified in doctrine. 
Furthermore, the data is heavily influenced by what capabilities exist or are deficient in  
the force. 
The survey consisted of 27 questions and was sent to officers, warrant officers 
(WO), and NCOs at the ODA level and above at all five active duty groups. The survey 
was distributed to approximately 140 individuals and received 122 responses during the 60 
days that it was open from May through July of 2020. Of these responses, 74% were from 
the ODA level, 19% were from the company level, and 7% were from the battalion level. 
These percentages roughly equate to leader distribution across the ODA, company, and 
battalion levels, which are 72%, 21%, and 5%, respectively, with 2% of the Regiment’s 
leaders represented at the group level. Finally, the sample size represents 10% of the leader 
population within the five active duty operational groups. Six of the questions on the survey 
are of particular interest to my question because they focus specifically on the 18A arriving 
at group, critiquing the training pipeline, and surveying impression of training vs utilization 
balance. 
The first three questions of interest ask open-endedly what new Special Forces 
captains need to know prior to arriving at group. Since they do not specify that the skills 
required to be learned need be taught in any one course, they are of particular value. 
Additionally, they seek to stratify levels of depth in responses using the 18A course’s 
binning of critical tasks into the categories of proficient, familiar, and aware, which was 
developed by a 2019 18A working group during the SFQC optimization. The precise 
definitions of these three bins are defined below as the questions are listed as they appeared 
on the survey. It should be noted that when the questions refer to Group, survey respondents 
would understand this to mean any of the five operational Special Forces groups.  
1. What skills do new Special Forces captains need to be proficient in before 
arriving to Group? (The captain must be a subject matter expert in these 
skills on day one at Group.) 
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2. What skills do new Special Forces captains need to be familiar with before 
arriving to Group? (The captain must fulfill a role in these skills on day 
one at Group.) 
3. What skills do new Special Forces captains need to be aware of before 
arriving to Group? (The captain can develop familiarity or proficiency in 
these skills after arriving at Group) 
These three questions establish a gradient that goes from things integral to the role 
of an 18A, things important for the 18A to function as a member of the team, and things 
safe to assume risk for on the job training.  
The next two questions form a subcategory that deal with critiquing the current 
training process and appeared as follows. 
4. Are there any skills that new Special Forces captains will need in the 
future that are not currently being taught prior to their arrival at Group? 
5. Are there any skills that new Special Forces captains will not need in the 
future (or present) that are currently being taught prior to their arrival at 
Group? 
These two questions ask what should be added to or removed from the 18A training 
pipeline without being specific to any one portion of the pipeline. Each of these first five 
questions gave respondents a free text box to respond. There were no suggested or primed 
answers.  
The last question of interest within the survey asks respondents to give an ideal 
balance between the amount of time a captain spends in training vs. utilization. The 
question appeared as seen below and had a drop-down menu response with percentages in 
intervals of 10%. For example, 10% training and 90% utilization. 
6. What is an appropriate balance of time investment for a Special Forces 
captain to spend in initial training vs. time spent in utilization at Group 
(understanding that some training will occur at Group during utilization)? 
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This question provides useful insights into the cultural impressions that exist among 
Special Forces soldiers about the training/utilization dilemma expressed in Chapter I. 
C. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS 
Three potential criticisms exist with using this data set: survey respondents 
provided their answers in their free time rather than as a dedicated working group, the 
survey was attached to questions regarding the 18A course specifically, and some 
responses are broad topic answers thus making it difficult to determine what the respondent 
actually intended. However, these three criticisms do not prevent harvesting useful insights 
from the data provided. 
Criticism 1: The survey questions ask a lot from someone with a day job fulfilling 
a tasking as an additional duty. Respondents to this survey are serving in the active force 
and thus already have a day job. Therefore, a complex open-ended question such as what 
a person needs to know is very unlikely to receive a lot of research and contemplation 
before being answered. While this is true, there are two counter points to consider: the 
data’s value comes in the aggregate and the respondents are subject matter experts. While 
no one individual’s response truly gets at the totality of what an 18A needs, each response 
is a puzzle piece to a larger picture. Respondents emphasizes certain aspects or parts of the 
picture with which they have had strong experiences, positive or negative. Furthermore, 
each respondent is a senior enlisted soldier who has spent years working under various 
commands of 18As, a field grade officer who has been a detachment commander and now 
supervises them, or is currently a detachment commander under the demands of the job. 
This gives each of the respondents a subject matter expertise that provides useful insights 
in even off-the-cuff responses to these questions. These two pieces ensure that there is still 
quite a bit of value in the aggregated data from these subject matter experts.  
Criticism 2: The questions, which ask the respondent to think without respect to 
one individual school within an officer’s training pipeline, were situated inside a survey 
about the training outcomes of the 18A course. This is perhaps the most valid criticism 
because it follows that respondents would be primed to focus on the 18A course 
specifically. While there are multiple examples of critiques of the 18A course specifically 
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in the data, most respondents appear to have read and answered the questions at face value. 
There are even several responses where individuals reference training received at the 
ARSOFCCC that illustrate respondents were thinking holistically as the question leads. 
Criticism 3: Broad responses or single word responses make it difficult to determine 
the intent of the respondent. Again, there are two factors mitigating this criticism of the 
data. The first is that the researcher is coming from within the community; from my 
perspective of having spent 6 years within this community, I could conclude that most 
responses showed clear intent. However, when that failed, the second mitigation technique 
was the option to simply discard the response. With over 100 answers each to the first three 
questions, losing a handful of incoherent responses would not affect the integrity of the 
data source. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
I conducted analysis on the data in three sections. The first section included the first 
three questions regarding skills captains needed to be proficient, familiar, and aware. 
Analysis began with an initial pass to code the responses. During this first coding pass, I 
liberally allocated subjects for responses. If one response mentioned the military decision-
making process (MDMP) and another mentioned troop leading procedures (TLPs), I kept 
these two subjects separate during the first pass. After completing the first pass, I analyzed 
the subjects for each question and developed a model where some of the subjects could be 
combined into themes. For example, MDMP and TLPs could be combined into a mission-
planning theme. Once the themes were established, I returned to the data for a second pass 
of coding. This time, I coded each original response under the themes that had been 
developed from the first pass. Single responses could code under several themes given the 
applicability of those responses to multiple themes. For example, a response about briefing 
Department of State (DOS) personnel could score for interagency knowledge and 
communication. This provided a numerical value for number of occurrences each theme 
appeared in the responses. With this data, I could construct a model of themes with 
corresponding subjects of instruction accompanied with numerical values to quantify the 
level of depth. 
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The other two sections followed a simple coding methodology. The second section 
consisted of the two questions critiquing the current training pipeline. These responses 
required only a single coding pass and were coded in the same fashion as the first pass 
described above. This produced a list of subjects the force was requesting to add and 
remove at some point during the 18A training pipeline. Finally, the third section was the 
final question quantifying the balance between training and utilization. The responses to 
this question came back in a quantitative form that did not require further analysis. 
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III. RESULTS 
The results of the survey revealed a multitude of tasks required for 18As and little 
majority conclusion on depth for these subjects. The value of the survey is developing a 
full picture of what skills an 18A needs to succeed as a captain. In practice, the survey 
questions were like asking respondents to list out what topics should be included in an 
encyclopedia of U.S. history. No one respondent in this analogy is going to provide a 
definitive listing of all things that should be included in the encyclopedia. Although, a large 
enough sample size would provide diverse enough responses to sufficiently cover the 
subject. This is what happened with the SWCS survey. There were few subjects that 
appeared in a majority of responses, but the responses are helpful if viewed as a myriad of 
different puzzle pieces that, when aggregated, can provide a complete picture of what a 
new 18A needs to learn. I will present the data from the survey and analysis in three parts. 
The first will be to detail the demographics of the respondents and total response counts 
for each question. The second will be to present a model for an 18A built from the first 
three questions of the survey with an accompanying analysis. The third and final part will 
be to present the data from the second set of three questions that critique the current training 
pipeline and address perceptions on the time vs. utilization constraint. 
A. RESPONDENTS 
Respondents to the survey can be seen on the Table 1. Of the 122 total respondents, 
not all the respondents provided answers for the five fill-in-the-blank questions discussed 
in the previous chapter. Table 1 organizes the respondents based on their command level 
(ODA, company, and battalion), then their position or grade within that command level, 
and shows percentages of total respondents by position (percentage) and command level 
(block percentages). Table 2 subsequently shows the number of responses collected for 
each of the six questions. 
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(Grade) Responses Percentage 
Block 
Percentages 
ODA / Team Level 
Captain (O3) 32 26.2% 
73.8% 
Warrant Officer 
(WO1/CW2) 5 4.1% 
Operations 
Sergeant (E7/E8) 53 43.4% 
Company Level 
Commander (O4) 9 7.4% 
18.9% 
Operations Warrant 
(CW3) 2 1.6% 
Sergeant Major 
(E9) 12 9.8% 
Battalion Level 
Commander (O5) 4 3.3% 
7.4% 
Operations Warrant 
(CW4) 3 2.5% 
Sergeant Major 
(E9) 2 1.6% 





Q4—Not taught in current training pipeline 96 
Q5—Remove current training pipeline 81 
 
B. THE MODEL FOR AN 18A 
Using the responses from the first three questions of the survey, I constructed a 
model of skills that need to be addressed during an 18A’s initial instruction. The model 
includes 42 individual subjects grouped into 10 themes that fit into three categories. The 
model is displayed in Table 3 and the Appendix. Each individual subject displays a 
numerical value (x/y/z) next to it that represents the number of responses for proficient, 
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familiar, and aware, respectively. These subjects should ideally form the basis for a holistic 
18A individual critical task listing that can be accomplished at any point throughout the 
training pipeline. Tables 4 through 6 display the distribution of responses for each subject 
across the range of depths of proficient, familiar, and aware. Note that these three tables 
are showing a percentage distribution of the total number of times a response for a subject 
was recorded, they do not reflect the quantity of responses for each subject. 
 Model for an 18A 
Be Know Do 
Leader 
-Principles of Mission 
Command (23/7/4) 
-Decision Maker (5/0/1) 
Doctrine 




and Interdependence (2/8/1) 
Train 
-350-1 Series Publications (6/9/3) 
-Battle Focused Analysis (BFA) / 
Long Range Training Calendar 
(LRTC) (13/13/7) 
-Funding / Resource Management 




-WO Professional Development 
(1/1/1) 
-Counseling / Evaluation 
Reports (2/3/2) 
-Command Supply Discipline 
(2/0/3) 
Organization 
-SOF Enterprise (12/17/21) 




-Staff Functions (3/2/3) 
-Interagency / DOS / 
Embassy (9/11/7) 
Plan 
-Mission Planning & Tools: 
TLPs, MDMP, OPORDs, 
CONOPs, and staffing processes 
(63/12/8) 
-Operations Continuum (4/1/0) 
-Enabler integration (2/4/7) 
Professional 
-National Defense Policy 
(10/6/5) 
-Regional Familiarity (7/3/9) 
-Language (7/4/0) 
-Basic Soldier Skills (12/12/10) 
 Operate -Combined Arms Maneuver: 
tactics and patrolling (26/5/4) 
-Mission Sets / Types (21/16/10) 
-Ground Force Commander 
(18/17/3) 
-Risk Management (4/2/1) 





-Surrogate Leadership (14/5/2) 
-Key Leader Engagements 
(27/6/1) 
-Domestic Interactions (34/7/7) 
-Negotiation, Influence, 
Persuasion (23/10/2) 
 Communicate -Oral (34/6/4) 
-Writing (27/3/5) 
-Mediums: radios and computers 
(3/5/7) 
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 Distribution of Responses by Depth for the “Know” Category 
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 Distribution of Responses by Depth for the “Do” Category 
 
 
The “be” category relates to the intangible aspects of a Special Forces captain. 
Much of the training for these subjects comes in the forms of mental or character trait tools 
and techniques rather than instruction on particular procedures or skills. This category has 
four themes that include leader, manager, professional, and interpersonal skills. Every 
Special Forces officer must be a leader, but leadership does not necessarily encompass 
tasks associated with being a good manager. An officer could be a good manager without 
succeeding as a leader and vice versa. Professional skills relate to those things that deal 
solely with the Special Forces officer himself/herself, such as personal knowledge or 
individual skills. Interpersonal skills could appropriately be categorized as a subject under 
the professional theme, but it includes a diverse number of components that deserve their 
own theme. As many as one-third of the survey respondents included specific references 
to interpersonal skills. 
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The second category of “know” includes subjects in which a Special Forces officer 
must have a base of knowledge. This category includes the themes of doctrine and 
organizational knowledge. Organizational knowledge is a massive theme as the responses 
coded for this subject included knowledge about the various MOSs within an ODA, 
organizational structure of a Special Forces battalion and group, and structure and 
capabilities of joint force special operations. Special Forces captains must know who and 
where to execute their interpersonal and communication skills to get their teams on mission 
and know who and where to find resources to ensure those missions succeed. Of note, many 
of the subjects within this theme ranked higher among the familiar depth than proficient 
depth. 
The last category of “do” includes subjects relating to specific tasks that Special 
Forces officers will have to accomplish in the operational groups. They will have to train, 
plan, operate, and communicate. Subjects in this category made up more than 50% of the 
total responses across all respondent’s answers and includes the top subject of mission 
planning. Other notable entries within this category were oral communication and 
combined arms maneuver, which includes patrolling and tactics. Many responses stressed 
a need for a mastery of tactics and patrolling through either experience or training such as 
Ranger school. 
Most of the subjects within the model are intuitive, but there are a few subjects that 
would benefit from further clarification. These subjects are domestic interactions, 
operations continuum, and enabler integration vs. employing enablers. Furthermore, 
“permissions and authorities” came up several times throughout the survey responses and 
it would be helpful to clarify where these responses are represented in the model since they 
did not get a subject of their own. 
Domestic interactions as a subject under the interpersonal theme encompasses 
interpersonal interaction with other U.S. personnel from senior commanders to ODA 
teammates. A multitude of responses referenced a captain’s ability to interact positively 
with members on the ODA. Still other responses referenced interactions with higher level 
U.S. commanders or DOS engagements. These higher-level interactions also scored for the 
interagency and communication subjects, but they scored for domestic interactions to 
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encompass the vast interactions conducted outside of formal briefings and written 
communication. The subjects of surrogate leadership and key leader engagements (KLEs) 
refer to non-US civilian, military, or partner forces interactions. 
Operations continuum under the plan theme references the range of military 
operations that ODAs can be deployed in support of and the types of missions that ODAs 
can expect to have to plan. Responses coded here included references to the range of 
military operations but for a planning purpose. The mission types subject under the operate 
theme may appear similar, but it pertains to specific mission sets, permissions, and 
authorities such as joint combined exchange training (JCET) and counter-narcotics training 
(CNT) missions. The operations continuum subject is intended for understanding planning 
of operations to include urban assaults, rural raids, partner assisted operations, and 
unilateral operations in peace and wartime environments. 
The two subjects of enabler integration and employing enablers, under the themes 
plan and operate, recognize the difference between understanding enabler capabilities and 
the practical aspect of using those enablers. Survey responses that emphasized the 
importance of understanding how integrating enablers could benefit the mission, such as 
military working dogs or signals intelligence capabilities, more appropriately fit into the 
plan theme. Survey responses that emphasized the practical aspect of employing close air 
support or using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to battle track fell 
into the operate theme.  
Lastly, many responses simply included the words “permissions and authorities.” I 
categorized these responses into two subjects judging from the context of the response. The 
first subject is mission types because they deal with legal authorities for executing actions 
planned or done in support of the broad or overarching mission set. These include 
understanding the authorities and permissions of a combat mission with advise, assist, and 
accompany permissions and understanding authorities relating to advanced special 
operations during a JCET. Permissions and authorities also applied to the ground force 
commander (GFC) role. Here, they become specific to actions taken during an engagement 
or event within a larger mission. Examples of this include understanding the legal authority 
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of persons designated special status when invoking collective defense or understanding the 
construct for release authority of close air support used offensively and defensively. 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
The data collected shows a clear trend for a proficiency depth requirement in 
mission planning and tools, domestic interactions, oral (briefing) communication, KLEs, 
written communication, and combined arms maneuver. Each of these skills appeared in 
more than 20% of the responses for proficiency and their proficiency score outweighs their 
scores in familiarity or awareness by four to nine times as much. Therefore, they have both 
a high incident rate in responses and occur disproportionately within the proficiency depth 
compared to their occurrences at the other depths.  
Though, beyond these skills, it does not become as clear cut to identify depth 
requirements for each individual subject. This therefore requires more subjective 
interpretation by the analyst. For example, beyond the six skills listed above, the next most 
frequent proficient response was knowledge of Special Forces doctrine and core activities. 
However, for this subject the ratio of responses for proficient to familiar drops to only two 
to one, a significant decrease given the next highest subject (combined arms maneuver) 
was weighted four to one. This creates less emphasis on this skill needing to be trained to 
the proficiency level. Additionally, the GFC skills subject ranked nearly equal for 
proficient and familiar (18/17). This closeness of scores in the data is insufficient to declare 
quantitatively that GFC skills should be taught to proficient or familiar level. Although 
qualitatively, I would argue that this is a skill captains need to be proficient in since the 
legal authority of this burden will rest solely on them. These two examples just point out 
the difficulty of using the survey data to conclusively place each of the subjects neatly into 
one of the three depth bins. 
This lack of decisive trends is possibly the most fascinating aspect of the data 
collected from the survey and constitutes the first potential criticism of the survey results. 
No one subject or even collection of subjects is found across a clear majority of the 
answers. As stated above, the most common answer on the proficiency question was 
mission planning, but this only appeared in 56% of the responses. I would have expected 
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this incident rate to be far higher. The next most common subject after this was a tie 
between domestic interactions and oral communication, with each subject appearing in 
only 30% of the responses. Simply put, there was no one subject that appeared in most 
responses at any depth. I expected that there are at least some skills that nearly everyone 
would agree captains had to master. This relates back to a criticism first visited in the 
previous chapter that the answers provided on the survey may be incomplete because the 
survey responses are an additional task and not a product of a dedicated study or working 
group. 
The value of this data, however, is not in the strict numerical interpretation of the 
responses but rather in the breadth and scope of the responses. Erring on the side of 
collective value, I have not removed any responses to assist some subjects with a more 
commanding percentage. For example, one response to the proficiency question was “new 
Special Forces captains should be proficient in communication skills and application.” 
Surely there are more things that Special Forces captains need to be proficient in than 
communication skills. It is tempting to discount responses such as these as invalid because 
they seem clearly incomplete. However, there is still value in this response. 
Communication skills and application means written and oral communication, but also has 
interpersonal and communications mediums aspects. While the response seems simple, it 
contains a lot of context, even if it is not all encompassing of the skills an 18A should be 
proficient. Data points such as this example are what account for the seemingly low 
percentages of the critical skills such as planning, but they still provide value to the 
aggregated picture of a Special Forces officer. 
There could be another objection to the results of the survey by examining the 
population of the survey respondents. Table 1 states that 74% of the respondents came from 
the ODA level. These are O3s, WO1/CW2s, and E7/E8s. It is tempting to say that since 
senior leadership are only providing 26% of the responses, there is going to be a lack of 
strategic vision in the data. This is a legitimate criticism and a key point not to overlook. 
Respondents to the survey are overwhelmingly among the individuals who are currently 
living the life of or on the ODA with Special Forces captains. While there is some weigh 
in from senior leaders, the responses represent ground truth of what Special Forces is doing 
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and needs now at the ODA level. The questions directed respondents to discuss skills for 
entry level O3s, not the totality of an 18A’s career.  
Many responses included strongly worded references to trusting NCOs. This is 
perhaps unsurprising considering 55% of the survey respondents were NCOs. This is 
interesting because the questions asked what skills should be trained. I coded these 
responses under mission command and domestic interactions because they align to the 
mission command principles of build cohesive teams through mutual trust and accept 
prudent risk as well as deal with intra-team interpersonal dynamics. The interesting 
question here is whether this is a skill that can be trained. I am prone to say it can only be 
honed through experience and any training would be limited towards demonstrating the 
effectiveness of teams who trust one another. It becomes a completely different subject to 
begin to discern how to communicate that trust and draw a prudent line between micro-
management and oversight. This is something I believe leaders and subordinates at all 
levels struggle with and development occurs through experience rather than education. 
D. CRITIQUING THE CURRENT TRAINING PIPELINE 
Questions 4 and 5 related to critiquing the current officer training pipeline. These 
questions asked if there were things that needed to be included or removed from the current 
pipeline. Results of these two questions are presented in Table 7 and following discussion. 
As with the first three questions, there were no decisive subjects that stood out with any 
clear majority. Table 7 includes only those subjects or skills that received four or more 






 Responses, Counts, and Percentages for the “What to Add” Question 
Subject # Responses % of Total Responses 
Nothing, No, No Change, N/A 19 19.8% 
Cyber Threats 12 12.5% 
GFC Training 8 8.3% 
Unknown, Unfamiliar with 
Captain Training Pipeline 7 7.3% 
Controlling Assets / Close Air 
Support 6 6.3% 
Training / Resource Management / 
BFA 6 6.3% 
Interagency Relationships / 
Interaction 4 4.2% 
Non-US Partner Engagements 4 4.2% 
Permissions and Authorities 4 4.2% 
Advanced Special Operations 4 4.2% 
 
The top four things requested were cyber threats, GFC training, controlling close 
air support, and training management. Of these four, cyber is an interesting response 
because it is like saying that Special Forces officers need to understand air warfare. It is 
too broad of a one-word answer by itself. Many of the responses coded for this simply said 
“cyber” but some of the responses conveyed the idea of Special Forces captains knowing 
how to prevent enemy cyber offensive operations from interfering with the ODA 
conducting its mission. It should be noted though that there was no mention of cyber during 
the previous three questions seeking to definitively ask what skills Special Forces captains 
needed. Alternatively, ground force commander specific training, controlling close air 
support assets, and more training management enjoy the reinforcement that they are related 
to skills identified in the model by the first three questions. 
Answers for question five regarding what should be removed from the Special 
Forces officer training pipeline are far less helpful. When asked if there are any skills that 
new Special Forces captains will not need in the future (or present) that are currently being 
taught prior to their arrival at group, military free fall was the top subject with an impressive 
three mentions out of the 81 total responses. 57% of the responses (46 of the 81) indicated 
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that nothing needed to be removed from the training and another 12% (10 of the 81) stated 
they were unfamiliar enough with the training captains received to offer a critique. The 
data collected from this question is insufficient to give any meaningful conclusion. 
The final survey question regards force perception of the appropriate balance 
between time spent in training and time spent in utilization. Table 8 details the results of 
this question. 
 Responses, Counts, and Percentages for the 
“Training vs. Utilization” Question 
Initial training vs. Utilization # Responses % of Total Responses 
10% training vs. 90% utilization 3 2.5% 
20% training vs. 80% utilization 8 6.6% 
30% training vs. 70% utilization 53 43.4% 
40% training vs. 60% utilization 21 17.2% 
50% training vs. 50% utilization 22 18.0% 
60% training vs. 40% utilization 8 6.6% 
70% training vs. 30% utilization 5 4.1% 
80% training vs. 20% utilization 2 1.6% 
90% training vs. 10% utilization 0 0.0% 
 
The 30/70 split for training and utilization has a clear lead though there is a close 
tie between 40/60 and 50/50. Using the 30/70 split, this means 93.6 weeks of time available 
for training assuming a captain has six years as explained in Chapter I. The current 
optimized SFQC is 53 weeks in duration with an additional 20 weeks spent at the 
ARSOFCCC for a total of 73 weeks of training once the captain arrives at Fort Bragg. Also, 
a captain must travel to and attend SFAS then move to Fort Bragg. SFAS is a three-week 
event and the move could take anywhere from four to eight weeks depending on where the 
captain is moving from and how much personal leave they use in conjunction with the 
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move. Finally, there is a final move at the completion of training from Fort Bragg to the 
captain’s operational group, which will vary from between one to five weeks. With a small 
buffer built in for recycles or medical convalescence from injuries sustained during 
training, the current training pipeline time allotment aligns with largest segment of the 
force’s perception of what is appropriate, though not quite a majority. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This project began as an exercise to discover what skills Special Forces captains 
needed to know, then use depth of knowledge to prioritize the amount of time each skill 
should receive during the training pipeline (between the ARSOFCCC and SFQC). The 
survey data gave a wonderfully complex answer to the first part of the question, by leading 
to a model of the skills required of an entry level 18A and suggesting additions to the 18A 
training pipeline. The data however fell short on the second part of the question. There was 
little consistency beyond the top six skills to suggest that the rest of the skills in the model 
decisively belonged in one of the three depth bins. In this chapter, I will propose four 
additions to the 18A training pipeline that are supported by the data of the survey. After 
introducing and explaining the four subjects, I will propose points during the training 
pipeline where these skills can be included. 
A. FOUR SUBJECTS TO ADD 
The Special Forces officer training pipeline can benefit from enhancing the 
emphasis of four subject areas:  
• GFC specific training: battle tracking, painting the picture for higher, and 
release criteria 
• Training management: 350–1 series publications, unit assessment and 
enumeration, training opportunities, and resourcing 
• Mission sets and types: legal authorities, value by stakeholder, and 
funding 
• SOF enterprise: organization and capabilities within the Special Forces 
groups and across ARSOF and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
These four subjects appeared in the survey both as requirements for new Special 
Forces officers and as suggestions for additions to the training pipeline. The subjects of 
training management, mission sets and types, and SOF enterprise, apply to not just Special 
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Forces officers, but also to Civil Affairs officers and Psychological Operations officers. 
For this reason, these three subjects are prime candidates for integration into the newly 
expanded ARSOFCCC as referenced in Chapter I. GFC training has a narrower 
applicability to just Special Forces officers and therefore is more appropriate to integrate 
into the SFQC. 
GFC skills are not something captains should learn on the job at their unit. They 
are deceptively simple and largely a reflection of the contemporary operating environment 
where ODAs fight on a battlefield stacked with enablers and assets. It includes decision 
making, battle tracking, controlling enablers/assets beyond the ODA, and communicating 
with higher for situational awareness and legal liability. GFC skills are not being 
overlooked, they just do not have the complexity and repetition throughout the SFQC to 
ensure that captains are proficient in one of the most important and consequential roles 
they fulfil on an ODA. Throughout the SFQC, captains execute duties of a GFC in a 
resource constrained unconventional warfare environment. As such, they do not use the 
same sophisticated means of battle tracking a partner force nor get exposed to the near 
instant contact with a higher command element and the resources that element provides. 
Captains are therefore left to drink from a fire hose during their first full mission profile at 
an operational group when they suddenly have the multitude of assets available to them as 
is typical in the contemporary operating environment. It is critical to train new captains in 
both resource constrained and unconstrained environments when conducting GFC duties 
throughout training. 
Likewise, training management requires more attention than it currently receives, 
particularly on the practical aspects of how it works at units. The Combined Arms Center 
block of instruction on training management taught during the CCC common core is 
insufficient for Special Forces officers. It covers using MDMP to identify the skills a unit 
will require for a specific mission and developing a plan to train them. This is a basic step 
but falls far short of adequately preparing captains to assess, plan, and manage training at 
the level the operational force expects, particularly if the captain goes to a team without a 
WO.  
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Training resources and approvals differ slightly from unit to unit but educating 
captains further on fundamentals common to U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
would greatly enhance his/her ability to advocate for training resources. This starts with 
the 350–1 series of publications from the Army through 1st Special Forces Command 
(SFC), then the Army’s Objective T training methodology and how to use the combined 
arms registry to enumerate mission essential tasks (METs) levels of proficiency. Next is 
conducting a battle focus analysis where the captain, along with his/her ODA senior 
leadership, can assess the team’s capabilities and plan to improve certain METs through 
building a training calendar. Instruction for this section needs to include introductions to 
various large training venues from major, large scale training events like combined training 
center (CTC) rotations and Jade Helm to joint force training exercises such as Red Flag, 
Have Ace, and Northern Strike. An awareness of these events prior to arriving on a team 
will greatly improve a captain’s ability to advocate for training events and build a team’s 
training calendar. 
However, draft training calendar in hand, captains further need to understand the 
resourcing requirements to ensure these events on that training calendar occur. This 
includes funding arrangements (group sustainment funds, CTC funds, joint force funds, 
etc.), options for transportation of men and equipment to and from the event (line haul, air, 
FedEx, etc.), the impacts to dwell time for certain training events, and approvals to conduct 
realistic military training concepts to name a few. Finally, captains need to have an 
awareness of how their ODA’s training calendar factors into the larger semi-annual training 
brief through the command levels where these resource requirements are communicated 
and committed. Delving into these subjects would far better equip a captain to maximize 
the first training cycle after arriving on the ODA. 
Mission sets and types would enhance an officer’s understanding of authorities 
within missions. The nine Special Forces core activities are essential doctrine, but Special 
Forces captains require an understanding of the legal authorities and funding nuances that 
govern ODAs deploying to conduct these core activities. New Special Forces captains need 
institutional instruction on the various types of missions that ODAs deploy to support. 
Examples include JCETs, CNTs, subject matter expert exchanges, and combat missions, 
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among others. Each of these mission types needs to be addressed with a frame of reference 
for how they assist U.S. national/foreign policy from various stakeholder positions such as 
Department of Defense (DOD), DOS, the Army, and Geographic Combatant Commands. 
Additionally, the funding nuances for each of these missions is important. Understanding 
the funding streams for these activities reveals stakeholders and provides depth of purpose 
for these operations. If captains understand these aspects when they arrive at a unit, it 
allows them to better guide planning, conduct more effective pre-deployment site survey 
engagements, and understand their operating environment when on the mission. 
Finally, as the commander, lead planner, and representative of the ODA, captains 
must also have a deep familiarity with and exposure to the greater SOF enterprise. This 
subject starts at the ODA level and progresses through the capabilities of a Special Forces 
company, battalion, and group, the other 1st SFC tribes of Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations, ARSOF organizations of the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment, to the SOCOM forces of Naval Special Warfare, Marine 
Special Operations, Air Force Special Operations, and Joint Special Operations Command. 
A formal understanding of these units, their role and function, and organizational structure 
not only assists in interoperability, but fulfills a doctrinal understanding purpose to 
highlight what unique capabilities Special Forces possess in comparison to other U.S. SOF 
elements. This would greatly improve communication across the joint force as Special 
Forces captains would have a better understanding of who they were working with during 
deployments. It would also enhance representation of SOCOM with DOS engagements 
because captains could more clearly enumerate the value or purpose of one SOF formation 
from another to DOS audiences who view DOD elements with little differentiation. 
B. WHERE TO MAKE THE ADDITIONS 
As mentioned earlier, training management, mission sets and types, and the SOF 
enterprise are applicable and beneficial to all ARSOF, making them ideal to be added into 
the ARSOFCCC. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers would benefit 
equally from any training management procedures that occur at the 1st SFC level and 
higher, furthermore events such as semi-annual training briefs are common to most units 
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in the Army. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers would equally benefit 
from an understanding of mission sets and types, a subject that could be expanded within 
the ARSOFCCC to include mission sets and types fulfilled by Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations units. This would be intimate cross training at an early stage 
across the three 1st SFC tribes. Additionally, understanding the SOF enterprise is equally 
as crucial for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers. GFC skills however are 
more applicable to the Special Forces officers who have a direct combat mission. 
GFC skills must have a two-part instruction within the SFQC: conceptual 
understanding and practical application. Conceptual understanding must explain the 
purpose and value of maintaining an accurate common operating picture for a fight and 
communicating that picture to higher as well as discussion on the various levels of 
control/freedom GFCs can have over assets not organic to the ODA. This must be done 
with an understanding that each command element a captain serves under will have 
operational differences, but it is crucial for captains to understand the concepts governing 
how these structures are established.  
The practical application can come in the form of each fight or battle during the 
SFQC where the captain serves as the commander. This is where the SFQC needs to 
become more complex. The missions during small unit tactics and Robin Sage are fought 
in an absence of outside enablers. They are designed to simulate the austere environments 
of an unconventional warfare campaign. The problem is that they differ dramatically from 
what a captain will experience following graduation when he/she arrives in Afghanistan or 
Syria. Special Forces’ ability to fight in austere environments must never atrophy, but the 
complex and resource rich contemporary fighting environment presents its own challenges 
that must be honed. 
36 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
37 
APPENDIX.  SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER MODEL GRAPHIC 
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